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Abstract 
This article explores feelings of disappointment and failure among mi- grants in Italy. 
It argues that the ubiquitous circulation of discourses of disappointment can be traced 
to restricted possibilities for upward mobility produced by the legal, economic, and 
social forms of marginalization that migrants in Italy encounter. Disappointment, it 
contends, is the product of an imaginary migration trajectory that views moving on 
from Italy as the only way to be successful. Arguing that some low-status migrants 
can be considered “flexible citizens,” I examine how my respondents’ desires for 
mobility are shaped by opportunities and restrictions that are integral to contemporary 
capitalism, as well as by the differentiated inclusion into the global market that these 
produce. By their very nature, however, I show how these desires neglect other kinds 
of future imaginaries and arguably impede the chance to build greater equality for 
migrants and their children in the future.  
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 2 
Introduction 
 
The disappointment of those who aspire to migrate but ultimately never leave their 
homelands has been extensively discussed in anthropological literature on migration 
(Carling 2002; Gaibazzi 2014; Jansen 2009; Vigh 2009). Examining migrant 
experiences in Italy, in this article I place the focus on those who have migrated but 
who still feel as though they have failed due to their lack of onward mobility. My aim 
is to show that this sense of disappointment is largely due to the limited opportunities 
that Italy offers migrants for upward mobility (Fullin and Reyneri 2011; Reyneri and 
Fullin 2011; Reyneri 2004). In large part these limitations stem from the racialized 
discrimination that migrants experience on a daily basis and a deep concern that, 
despite having grown up in the country, their children would also face limited 
opportunities due to their “migrant” status. It is also, however, related to an imaginary 
migration trajectory in which moving from Italy is thought to be the only way to 
success. 
 A sufficient number of rumours and accounts of “successful” migrants who 
have managed to take advantage of Italy’s relatively flexible permit system, and the 
possibilities offered by the Schengen Area (Tuckett 2015), circulate in order to create 
a sense that on-migrating is possible if only one has the wherewithal to do it. These 
narratives and imaginations of on-migration play an important role in shaping the 
understanding of life trajectories for those who remain. Drawing on Ong (1999), I 
label those who did manage to on-migrate from Italy as “flexible citizens”. Such a 
theorisation highlights several key points which will be developed throughout the 
article. Firstly, it demonstrates the embeddedness of non-elite migration projects 
within contemporary logics of capitalism. Secondly, it underlines how this logic, 
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which places success and failure on the shoulders of individuals rather than on 
broader structures and migration policies, infuses the experience of migration. And 
lastly, it shows how this logic prioritises the process of migration as the only route to 
life improvement, thereby eclipsing alternative avenues for social betterment that 
might otherwise be pursued.  
 Studies conducted in places with high levels of emigration show that 
understandings and imaginations of “home” and “away” are structured by unequal 
global power relationships in which material success and personal development are 
only thought to be achievable through migration (Bal 2013; Gaibazzi 2014; Gardner 
1993; Gardner 2008; Vigh 2009). Focusing on the continued feelings of 
disappointment and personal failure experienced by those who have already migrated 
highlights how “hierarchies of globalisation” (Carling 2002: 37) mean that while most 
are incorporated into a globalizing world market, not everybody is able to benefit 
from it (Bal & Roos Willems 2014: 255). As I show, while studies have usually 
focused on those who are excluded from the migration process, it is also those who 
have left their homelands but still feel “unsuccessful” that experience this 
differentiated inclusion into the global market.  
 
Context 
 
This article is based on 19 months’ fieldwork conducted in a Northern Italian city. 
While Italy made a rather late entry as a “destination” country, with substantial 
numbers of migrants arriving only in the 1990s, in the last fifteen years its migratory 
inflow is second only to Spain (Fullin and Reyneri 2011: 118). In line with other 
Southern European countries, migrants are ambiguously viewed as “useful invaders” 
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(Ambrosini 1999). Unlike in some Northern European countries, such as Denmark 
and the Netherlands, where many migrants have fulfilled a demand for high-skilled 
labor (Reyneri and Fullin 2011: 50), in the Italian context migrant labor is desired, but 
only in order to fulfill low-tech and unskilled occupations, which generally hold little 
possibility for social mobility in spite of individuals’ educational achievements 
(Calavita 2005; Reyneri and Fullin 2011; Reyneri 2004). The vast majority of 
employed female migrants work as (live-in) carers and cleaners in private homes, 
filling the much needed care gap not provided by the state for the country’s ageing 
population. And male migrants are largely restricted to manual labour which has a 
low social status (Fullin and Reyneri 2011: 143).  
 Exclusionary and restrictive immigration laws, which ensure that most 
migrants only have temporary and insecure legal status, cement migrants’ subordinate 
position in the Italian labor market and wider society. Under the current law, legal 
status is contingent upon presenting a regular work contract. Consequently, regardless 
of how many years one has lived in the country, losing one’s job or being employed 
unofficially in the “black market” can result in the loss of legal status. The long term 
permit and citizenship offer possibilities for secure legal status but both are 
notoriously difficult to obtain. Immigration laws ensure, therefore, that migrants 
remain in poorly paid and low level jobs, since otherwise they risk falling into 
“illegality”.  
  This structural economic and legal marginalization is reinforced by the 
everyday racism and discrimination that migrants in Italy are routinely subject to. 
Among much of the native population, the reaction to migrants’ arrival has largely 
been characterized by racism and xenophobia (see Cole 2005; Grillo and Pratt 2002). 
The national media, which focuses on entry and control of migration flows rather than 
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possibilities for meaningful integration, has played a central role in the production of 
such attitudes (Cachafeiro 2002; Mai 2002), while the right-wing separatist party the 
Lega Nord (Northern League) is a key player in refining and perpetuating this rhetoric 
with prominent party figures frequently voicing racist and anti-immigrant views in the 
media. It is this interweaving of economic, legal and social marginalization, with 
limited possibility for upward mobility for migrants or their children, that shape and 
fuel this desire to leave Italy and thereby produce it as an inferior country in migrant 
imaginaries.  
 
Fieldwork 
 
Experiences with Italian immigration bureaucracy are characterized by long waiting 
times, changing laws, misinformation and the issuing of expired permits. In order to 
successfully navigate the immigration bureaucracy it is essential for even the most 
long-term migrants to have access to some form of advice provider. The migrant 
advice centre where I conducted the bulk of my research played a key role in helping 
migrants strategically navigate the shifting and uncertain terrain of migration 
bureaucracy, which I have called the Italian “documentation regime” (Tuckett 2015). 
The centre’s main functions were to act as a drop-in advice clinic on issues relating to 
immigration law and to complete application forms on behalf of clients free of charge. 
These included applications for permit renewal, family reunification and citizenship. 
The advice centre was part of a trade union, which was significant in terms of the 
centre’s role as a patronato. The term patronati refers to intermediary institutions 
attached to trade unions in which workers can receive free advice, assistance, 
protection, and representation (Agnoletto 2012: 13). Their role is to protect and 
 6 
advocate for welfare users and ensure that the welfare system is functioning correctly. 
Although they are not part of the state infrastructure, they are state-funded since the 
state pays the patronato for each assistance file opened (ibid). In general, however, 
clients were unaware that the advice centre was part of the trade union and the vast 
majority whom frequented the centre were not trade union members. 
Staff members at the centre were generally individuals who had previously 
been employed elsewhere within the trade union and had subsequently been employed 
at the migrant advice centre. Two of the seven employees were Italian citizens with 
migrant backgrounds, the remaining five were native Italians. Volunteers were key to 
the functioning of the office, in particular the reception counter. Volunteers tended to 
be either Italian students completing work experience or migrants.  
Reflecting the diversity of migrant nationalities across Italy and the city where 
I was working, the clients who frequented the centre were a heterogeneous group 
hailing from all over the world. Clients were also diverse in terms of their personal 
trajectories. Some had recently arrived in Italy, others had been in Italy for decades, 
or were even born in the country. Some already held citizenship, while others were 
looking for ways to regularize their status. The peculiarities of the Italian 
documentation regime mean that legal status is highly fluid, and it is not uncommon 
for somebody who has been in the country for decades to lose their legal status. 
Documentation status does not, therefore, reflect length of time spent in Italy. 
Reflecting this diversity, the research participants discussed in this article were from 
all over the globe and held various kinds of legal status. 
As a volunteer at the centre, I spent most of my time on the reception counter, 
but I also spent long periods of time with advisers at their desks in the back room 
participating in longer consultations. Much of my daily fieldwork was conducted in 
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the space of the centre, but over time I also developed close relationships with staff 
members, volunteers and some clients, so field research also took place in more 
intimate and social spaces.  
 
There is No Future Here 
 
For most migrants I knew who remained in Italy, there was a lingering sense of 
failure and disappointment. Analogous to the motivations that spurred initial 
migration, the desire to leave Italy was commonly framed in terms of trying to create 
a better future. Explaining why they did not want to remain, people described the 
racial discrimination they faced in Italy, as well as the associated lack of higher status 
job opportunities and the concern that their children would also face such 
discrimination. Biniam, a colleague at the advice centre who is originally from 
Eritrea, described living in Italy as akin to being in a “big prison”, where he could not 
imagine his life improving despite his hard work and sacrifice. In particular, he was 
concerned for his baby daughter Olivia whom, he semi-seriously joked, he would 
send to England with me in order to give her a better future. Further shaping this 
sense of dissatisfaction was the notion that there were improved possibilities 
elsewhere. This belief was closely related to the fact that some people did manage to 
move on from Italy – either temporarily or permanently – which compounded the 
sense of personal failure and disappointment for those who were unable to. 
A major cause of frustration and anger for migrants I knew was the sense that 
regardless of language ability, educational achievement, financial success or 
citizenship status, the colour of one’s skin – or some other indicator of “otherness” – 
would mean they would never be truly accepted in Italian society. As Cole and Saitta 
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have recently observed in a poignantly titled afterword “Italy, dreams of a 
monochrome society?”, the “master narrative emerging from opinion polls, political 
rhetoric and government policy and practice, is that Italy remains a white, Catholic 
nation rooted in Italian soil” (2011: 528). This narrative, they observe, is contradicted 
by the fact that a large number of migrants now live in Italy and make significant 
contributions to society. Most of all, it denies the emergence of a new Italian – “the 
youth of foreign origins” (ibid).  
As Riccio and Russo point out, the racialized divisions which exist are “not a 
matter of mere cultural racism; phenotypic characteristics have also become more and 
more relevant in fostering Italian internal boundaries” (2011: 326). For Flavia Stanely 
(2008) this is because in Italy ethnicity and nationality are conflated, meaning that 
anyone who is not considered to be Italian (or a tourist) is demarcated as 
“extracomunitario” – non-EU migrant. This understanding of citizenship and 
nationality based on ethnicity means that being identified as an immigrant foreigner 
(rather than a tourist foreigner) is to be identified as an inferior other. The assignation 
of such a status is closely tied to exterior appearance and the assumption that Italian-
ness can be detected through a certain kind of racialized body. Being defined as 
“other” in such stereotypical and negative terms based on appearance was a frequent 
cause for complaint among those with migrant backgrounds, all of whom experienced 
racism on a daily basis. As Al Badisi, an Italian citizen originally from Morocco 
recounted: 
 
Just this morning I was at the post office in Rosetta [small town north of the 
city]. I was filling in my bolletta [bill] and the woman working there was 
chatting to two carabanieri [military policemen]. The carabinieri turned to 
leave, calling out to the woman that they would pass by again. Then, I tell you, 
they turned their heads and looked pointedly in my direction. I know that they 
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meant it in reference to me, I was the only person in there and they were trying 
to say I was a threat to the woman.  
 
It was a similar story for Biniam, who told me: “when you get on a bus, people look 
at you suspiciously, as if you are going to rob their bag or something. Next time 
you’re on the bus, look around. The immigrants are at the back and the Italians are at 
the front.” In the case of female migrants, presumptions about criminality were 
expanded to include assumptions about prostitution. Chiara, originally from Eritrea, 
said the following: “do you know how many times men have pulled up in their cars 
on the side of the road while I’m waiting for the bus asking ‘how much?’ In broad 
daylight!” 
These statements echo the way in which “extracomunitari” are portrayed in 
the media according to racialized stereotypes. Al Badisi and Biniam were perceived to 
be “maghrebini” and thus dangerous (Biniam was actually Eritrean but was constantly 
mistaken for a Moroccan), while Chiara, as a black woman, was associated with 
prostitution. Such discrimination against presumed “extracomunitari” also affected 
access to work and housing. Chiara described to me her long and depressing 
processes of searching for rental property. On meeting her, prospective landlords who 
had been enthusiastic to rent to her over the phone quickly made up excuses as to why 
the property had suddenly become unavailable. 
These assumptions hold particular challenges for the second generation in 
Italy, where there is no discourse that acknowledges the existence of Asian or Black 
Italians as a cultural category. Rather, as Andall writes in relation to her work with the 
second generation in Milan, “being black and being Italian were perceived as 
mutually exclusive categories” (2002: 400). When I spent time with Chiara, who 
migrated to Italy from Eritrea when she was 13 years old, I frequently witnessed the 
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cultural confusion that is caused by being both Black and Italian. Chiara’s manner of 
speaking, gesticulating, walking and dressing signify her Italian-ness, yet her dark 
skin and long braided hair simultaneously mark her out as an “immigrant”. I often 
noticed a palpable moment of delay and confusion between when somebody first saw 
her and then heard her speak. Fully aware of the ambiguity she created for people, 
through her dark sense of humour she challenged these restricted ideas of identity and 
“Italian-ness”. A joke she recounted to me was that while she cleaned the stairs of the 
building in which she lived, she allowed people to think that she was Signora Chiara 
Mariotti’s cleaner and then revelled in their discomfort when she turned up to her 
building meetings as the Signora Chiara Mariotti: no-one would match the Italian 
name with her dark skin.  
Recent literature has shown that these racist and discriminatory attitudes are 
increasingly being contested, in particular by the second generation through 
involvement in migrant associations (Riccio and Russo 2011). As suggested by 
Chiara’s joke above, challenges to such prejudice are also being levelled through 
more informal everyday processes. In particular, the increasing presence of young 
ethnically diverse people speaking with strong regional Italian accents, who dress, 
move and gesticulate identically to their “native” peers, undermine these seemingly 
restricted categories of identity. Yet, despite these transformations and challenges, the 
structural obstacles which exclusionary immigration and citizenship laws create 
entrench the marginalization of migrants and their children, fundamentally limiting 
possibilities for change. Within this context parents were worried about their children 
growing up as second-class citizens. The chance of being professionally successful in 
the country seemed to feel unrealistic, even for “migrants” born and bred in Italy.  
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Such ideas were set against the belief that better futures could be found 
elsewhere. These imagined lives in other countries were developed through electronic 
media and contact with family and friends. When referring to life in other European 
countries people would exclaim, “black people are doctors and lawyers!” “There are 
shops where you can buy all the Eritrean ingredients,” or “your permit gets sent to 
you in the post”. Such positive images of accepting, cosmopolitan, and efficient 
countries were contrasted with Italy, which was viewed as discriminatory, inefficient, 
and backward. The conditions that pushed migrants into marginalized positions in 
Italian society, and created them as the subaltern “other”, led to their disparagement 
of the country for its perceived lack of cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism, and 
development. Although these opinions had a defensive use, they also fuelled 
migrants’ sense of failure: many ultimately blamed themselves for their lack of 
mobility.  
 
Italy as a Stepping Stone 
 
The disappointment and sense of personal failure of those who remained was 
compounded by the continuously circulating stories and rumours of those who had 
managed to on-migrate. While in general, encounters with Italian immigration 
bureaucracy are characterized by uncertainty, arbitrariness, and delay, its ambiguous 
nature also creates scope for flexibility and manipulation (Tuckett 2015). As one 
colleague at the advice centre frequently observed with regard to Italian bureaucracy, 
“the impossible is possible”.  
In the stories that follow, Italy was often represented as a kind of “soft 
option”, as migrants took advantage of the country’s relatively flexible permit system 
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in order to scope out opportunities in other European countries (Schuster 2005). With 
the freedom to cross borders enabled by the Schengen agreement, migrants could use 
Italy as a place to access and renew permits while working elsewhere and eventually 
permanently on-migrating. Migrants were also aware of the benefits offered by 
particular host countries, with Scandinavian states particularly favored due to their 
reputation for strong social welfare systems and high levels of employment. On the 
other hand, decisions about where to on-migrate were also determined and 
constrained by diplomatic and legal frameworks. Thus social imaginations 
(Appadurai 1996) of migration destinations were shaped by, and constructed on, the 
basis of stories, rumours and experiences, as well as pragmatic knowledge about 
concrete laws.  
For those who did manage to on-migrate, individual on-migration stories 
varied significantly. Some on-migrated almost immediately on arrival, as part of a 
pre-arranged plan. Others on-migrated years later, sometimes after even having 
acquired Italian citizenship. Still other individuals left Italy several times before 
finally moving back to Italy and settling there. The differences between people’s 
trajectories depended on various factors, such as their “home” country, whether they 
had family members or contacts in Italy or elsewhere, or the location for which they 
had managed to access visas. On the other hand, there were many migrants who may 
have desired to on-migrate at some point in the past, but who had since established 
themselves in Italy and no longer wished to uproot.  
  Cases of successful on-migration were not uncommon, but they also held a 
mythic quality. Stories of these cases were frequently the subject of conversation at 
the centre. They were good fodder for gossip, but they also held a practical function 
for clients who wanted to know how they could go about emulating a certain aspect of 
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a particular case that they had heard about. Such stories circulated within 
communities while gossiping at social occasions, as well as between communities in 
work places or at various sites within the documentation regime where people were 
invariably forced to wait around. Their circulation acted to shape imaginaries about 
future possibilities, as well as acting as practical guidance. The following cases 
illustrate two different types of on-migration trajectories. The first set of case studies 
draws on members of the Eritrean community who on-migrated from Italy. The 
second case study focuses on another typical trajectory: the use of Italy as a legal 
stopping base while travelling to other European countries in search of improved 
employment opportunities.  
Through my close connection with Biniam and Chiara, siblings who 
respectively worked and volunteered at the centre and whom were originally from 
Eritrea, I came to know many individuals from the Eritrean community. Conversation 
and gossip over coffees and meals at people’s houses and at Eritrean bars frequently 
revolved around the migration trajectories of community members. As well as my 
exposure to these stories due to my association with the community, focusing on 
Eritreans’ on-migration is illuminating in two respects. Firstly, as I will explore 
below, Eritreans were more likely than other groups to successfully on-migrate from 
Italy. Secondly, and relatedly, because of the frequency of on-migration stories (both 
successful and unsuccessful) the importance of stories and rumours in shaping 
people’s imaginaries of future migration trajectories, or their lack of mobility, was 
particularly pronounced.  
Given the allegations of human rights abuses against Eritrea’s president, 
which include denying his citizens human and democratic rights, freedom of speech, 
and legally obliging them all to undertake indefinite military service, Eritrean citizens 
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have relatively good chances for successfully claiming asylum. In comparison to 
other migrants who would not be eligible for asylum, Eritreans have two further 
incentives to leave Italy. Firstly, they have possibilities to gain legal status that others 
would not (although, as will be detailed below, the Dublin Regulation means that 
traversing through Italy is risky). And secondly, because Eritreans have a fairly good 
chance of successfully claiming asylum, those countries that provide welfare 
provision for refugees – which Italy does not – are, understandably, more desirable to 
this group. Decisions about where to on-migrate are heavily influenced by the 
trajectories of those who have gone before. “For the Eritrean community, Italy is just 
a stepping stone,” Biniam told me one quiet afternoon in the centre sitting at the 
counter.  
 
No-one ends up staying here. Of the group I arrived with [other Eritreans who 
arrived in the same year], there were eight of us and now there is only me left. 
Eritreans are like sheep: they all follow each other. It used to be Great Britain 
but now Sweden is the country of choice. I would say about 95 percent of 
Eritreans who come to Italy these days move on elsewhere.1 
 
In recent years, Biniam informed me, Eritreans have been less successful in claiming 
asylum in the UK, whereas chances of having claims accepted were perceived to be 
higher in Sweden, where refugees also enjoy a more generous social welfare system 
than in Italy, receiving housing and benefits.2 When I asked him who remained in 
Italy and why, Biniam responded that those who have family or other obligations may 
be forced to remain, while others were “deficienti” (half-wits) and unable to migrate 
elsewhere. 
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The prevalence of on-migration among Eritreans was confirmed by the 
countless numbers of such nationals I met in my 19 months’ fieldwork, many of 
whom were about to leave or had already done so. There was the Professore, as 
Biniam called him, who had previously been a university lecturer in Asmara. After 
several years spent saving money in Italy, he decided to move to the United States 
where he would try to claim asylum. He undertook a dangerous journey that involved 
travelling from Italy to El Salvador and Mexico before entering the United States as 
an asylum-seeker. While the United States was often discussed as the desired 
destination for many Eritreans, the risks and costs involved in getting there were too 
high for most.  
In other cases, migrants tried to ensure that their children on-migrated. Several 
parents I knew successfully applied for their children to join them in Italy through 
family reunification, only to swiftly send them away to other European countries. 
Fekle spent months struggling to apply for her 16 year-old son Simon to come to Italy 
from the Sudan through family re-unification. Weeks after he arrived, Simon hid in a 
lorry and crossed the channel to the UK, where he claimed asylum as a 14-year-old. 
His application was successful and an English family has since adopted him. 
Although Fekle was again separated from her son, she considered his on-migration a 
success and was comforted by the belief that he faced a brighter future.  
The flexibility allowed through eligibility for asylum or humanitarian 
protection is, however, severely curtailed by the Dublin Regulation which dictates 
that would-be refugees should remain in the first country they arrive in.3 Therefore, 
asylum seekers arriving on the shores of Italy must claim asylum in Italy. This means 
that those who had on-migrated elsewhere, and who had successfully been granted 
asylum, were risking future deportation back to Italy. Unaware of such laws, many 
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Eritreans have claimed asylum in the UK, and other countries, after originally passing 
through Italy. Those who fall victim to efficient immigration bureaucracy may have 
their asylum revoked, sometimes even years later, after it is discovered that records of 
their fingerprints already exist in Italy. 
In this respect, migrating to the US or other countries not involved in the 
Dublin Regulation is safer as records of claimants’ fingerprints will not be on a shared 
database. One way to reduce the risk of discovery was to avoid claiming asylum in 
Italy altogether. Indeed, many of those I knew who had successfully gained asylum 
elsewhere in Europe had previously been living in Italy, not as refugees, but rather 
with family or work permits, and some even had citizenship. While the fingerprint 
databank for asylum claimants was likely to be crosschecked, the border agency of 
the new destination countries cannot feasibly crosscheck asylum seekers’ fingerprints 
with those of all legal migrants living in countries that have signed the Dublin 
Regulation. Therefore, by not claiming asylum in Italy and instead obtaining a permit 
through other means, these Eritreans were effectively remaining beneath the radar and 
were unlikely to be caught out when they eventually did claim asylum in the UK, 
Sweden or elsewhere.  
An Eritrean woman called Yanet had adopted this strategy. She was the 
partner of Dewat, a close friend of Biniam and Chiara. Dewat had lived without 
papers in Italy for ten years. He eventually obtained a permit during the 2009 
domestic worker amnesty. This amnesty, in theory, gave undocumented domestic 
workers who had been working in Italy before April 2009 the opportunity to gain a 
permit through their employer. In reality, however, the law gave the opportunity to be 
regularized to anybody who was able to find, and usually pay, an “employer” (Tuckett 
2015). Luckily for Dewat, Chiara was able and willing to “hire” him, and in 2010 he 
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was successfully issued with a permit. Yanet had lived in Italy for over five years 
where she held the long-term permit, public housing, and a job in a cleaning 
company. Several years previously, during the time Dewat had been trapped in Italy 
due to his “irregular” status, Yanet had moved to Sweden, where she had claimed and 
been granted asylum, and was now living as a refugee with their two young children. 
Living in Stockholm she received the full benefits to which she was entitled as a 
refugee. Meanwhile, in Italy, she remained, on paper, a legal resident. Her public 
housing was still in her name (where Dewat lived) and she continued to receive 
contributions for maternity leave. In Sweden, Yanet lived under a different name and, 
because she had never claimed asylum in Italy, was very unlikely to be discovered.  
I met Yanet when she made a return trip to Italy in which she was organizing 
paperwork related to her resignation from the cleaning company. Eventually her paper 
existence in Italy would fade, as her documents relating to her legal status, public 
housing, and employment among others expired. Happily living in Stockholm, this 
was not a problem. The key to Yanet’s success was her foresight in not having 
claimed asylum in Italy which would have meant her fingerprints were recorded in the 
database which EU member states share. In 2011, after Dewat received his permit 
through the amnesty in Italy, he joined Yanet in Sweden. Paradoxically, while his 
previously “irregular” status had confined him within Italy’s borders for over ten 
years, his permit to stay in the country enabled him to leave it. Two weeks after 
arriving in Sweden under a different identity, Dewat claimed asylum: his claim has 
since been accepted. Although he had previously attempted to claim asylum in Italy, 
he was unlikely to be caught out by the Dublin Regulation as more then ten years had 
passed since he had made the original claim, at which time the electronic database for 
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fingerprints did not exist. Without this technology it would be very difficult for 
Dewat’s double claim to be discovered.  
 
Legal base 
It is not only by claiming asylum elsewhere that migrants on-migrate from Italy. The 
long-term permit also offers possibilities for starting a life in a new destination, as it is 
technically valid for work purposes in all Schengen-member states. Ironically, for 
many the motivation to obtain this permit is to leave Italy. Those who were holders of 
the long-term permit, or desired to be, frequently visited the centre to ask for 
information about which countries it was possible to work in and how. Some did 
permanently migrate to other countries if they found work, while others would live 
elsewhere for a period of time before returning to Italy and possibly on-migrating 
again if they could. Sharif, the husband of a Pakistani woman I knew, was mostly 
absent from family life. For weeks at a time he went to different Schengen member 
countries, including Norway, Sweden and others, in attempts to find secure 
employment. While away he worked on short-term contracts doing manual labor or 
factory work. Sharif’s wife told me how her husband thought there were better 
employment options outside of Italy, and once he had found something permanent the 
whole family intended to migrate. The long-term permit gave him the freedom to 
follow employment opportunities across borders as it did not require renewal and 
therefore did not necessitate presenting evidence of income in Italy for such renewal. 
Whether individuals did permanently migrate elsewhere or left Italy only for brief 
periods of time, Italy could be used as a platform to enter Europe or as a base where 
legal status was more easily obtainable and from where other opportunities in Europe 
could be scoped out. Since “illegal” status immobilizes migrants, Italy’s easily 
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manipulated rules and access to permits made it a country which migrants could use 
as a legal base until they were either securely set up elsewhere, or until they made 
Italy their final destination country.  
 
Flexible Citizens 
 
For those who took advantage of Schengen freedom of movement laws or cheap 
flights to travel to Sweden in order to claim asylum, the motivation to leave Italy ran 
parallel to the logic that had compelled them originally to migrate: that of moving to 
places which offered better opportunities for life improvement. Leaving Italy was also 
bound up with decisions based around families and networks which were often 
situated in a historical context of colonialism. However, while recognizing the 
complexity and nuances in migrants’ decisions to on-migrate, I suggest that we can 
view my respondents’ stories as revealing a wider discourse situated within the 
“cultural logics of accumulation” (Ong 1999: 6) in which improved social and 
material capital were desired.   
While Ong’s high-flying and elite Chinese respondents faced significantly 
different concerns to those which preoccupied my informants, her arguments 
surrounding flexible citizenship have relevance here:  
 
Flexible citizenship refers to the cultural logics of capitalist accumulation, 
travel, and displacement that induce subjects to respond fluidly and 
opportunistically to changing political-economic conditions. In their quest to 
accumulate capital and social prestige in the global arena, subjects emphasize, 
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and are regulated by, practices favoring flexibility, mobility, and repositioning 
in relation to markets, governments, and cultural regimes (1999: 6).  
 
She further notes that, “those most able to benefit from participation in global 
capitalism were those able to celebrate flexibility and mobility” (1999: 19). As I have 
shown here, flexibility and mobility are also valued by migrants drawn from more 
humble backgrounds, who, although lacking elite status, nonetheless aspire to the 
“good life”. Therefore, while flexible citizens are viewed by Ong as part of a global 
elite whose mobility is enabled by their wealth, the stories presented here have shown 
how the marginal and seemingly immobile can also be considered as flexible citizens 
in a contemporary global marketplace. While the long-term permit is intended to 
confer secure legal status in Italy, for my informants it was used, with varying degrees 
of success, as a means of accessing more profitable labor markets elsewhere. As we 
have seen, by taking advantage of the Schengen Area, those with long-term permits 
and good networks of contacts were able to engage in Europe’s diverse labor markets 
and accumulate capital. While Italy was not perceived as the ideal destination 
country, given the relative ease with which documents could be accessed, for flexible 
citizens it was able to serve as a legal base when opportunities elsewhere were more 
restricted.  
On-migrating was not solely rooted in economic instrumentalism. In reference 
to migrants’ hopes for their children, individuals not only hoped that in the future 
their offspring would be able to enjoy improved circumstances for capital 
accumulation, but also that they would be free from racist and xenophobic 
discrimination. As observed by Calavita (2005), migrants’ experiences of racism, 
legal precarity and economic marginalization in Italy are deeply intertwined. Among 
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my informants, many felt frustrated by the fact that, regardless of their citizenship 
status, integration or wealth, they would nonetheless continue to be considered 
“immigrati”, with all of the negative associations and limitations for social mobility 
that the term implies. Of course, my interlocutors’ ideas regarding racial equality 
elsewhere may have been idealistic. Indeed, Ong notes how in the US her rich 
Chinese respondents struggled to be recognized as holding cultural capital, since there 
was a “mismatch… between the symbolic capital and its embodiment” (1999: 91-92). 
Despite this, however, my informants held firm to their conviction that outside of 
Italy their opportunities for social and economic mobility would be improved. As 
such, their desires to leave Italy were embedded in their aspiration to gain social and 
economic capital for them and their children, as well as to escape racialized 
discrimination.  
In labelling those who left flexible citizens I do not wish to romanticize their 
on-migration. As we have seen, migrants were on-migrating in order to take up 
subordinate positions in other societies, either in low-level jobs or as welfare-
dependent refugees. Analytically situating non-elite migrants as flexible citizens, 
however, highlights the ways in which they are as equally embedded in the cultural 
logics of capitalism, transnationalism, and globalization as the high-flying investors 
that Ong describes. As the next section will show, this is important, not only in 
framing the practices of those who leave Italy, but also to accurately understand the 
situations of those who remain, who acutely experience the inequalities created by the 
uneven nature of globalization and capitalism. 
 
Feelings of Failure 
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While the previous section largely described people who did actually leave Italy, for 
most such mobility is not possible. In reality, the standard permit (in contrast to the 
less-easily-acquired long-term permit) allows little freedom. Permit renewal is a time-
consuming process, contingent on evidence of salary and employment (Tuckett 2015). 
An individual who has spent most of the year outside of Italy would be unlikely to 
hold the requisites needed for renewal, meaning that continued domicile and 
employment in Italy is necessary, unless one is prepared to become an “irregular” 
migrant elsewhere.  
Despite these realities, there were sufficient accounts and rumours of 
successful on-migration stories to create a feeling among those who remained that it 
was their own personal inability to take advantage of opportunities, which had led 
them to remain in Italy and – as they perceived it – live a less successful life. Feelings 
of disappointment around one’s staying in Italy were, therefore, dialogically related to 
the sense that there were improved possibilities elsewhere and that others were 
managing to take advantage of them.  
This dialogical relationship is akin to that between “home” and “destination” 
countries, so often explored in anthropological literature on migration. As noted 
earlier, this body of work has focused on the experiences of those who remain in a 
locality from which there is a large amount of migration (Gaibazzi 2014; Gardner 
1993; Gardner 2008; Vigh 2009). In relation to this, drawing on Bourdieu, Vertovec 
(2004) has coined the phrase “transnational habitus” to describe the extent to which 
transnationalism structures the experience, dispositions and practices of even those 
who never migrate. Within this habitus, geographic movement and economic success 
are inextricably linked, since in the minds of both migrants and non-migrants alike, 
“connectedness to the global labor market is seen as virtually the only avenue for 
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success” (Gardner 2008: 485, 488). Transnationalism is not, therefore, about equal 
global flows, but rather about dialogical relationships of power between localities 
(Gardner 1993, 2008) within which “mobility is the most powerful and most 
stratifying factor” (Baumann in Carling 2002: 38). While studies have largely focused 
on those who are unable to migrate, here the situations of those who have migrated 
but who nonetheless still feel immobile are considered. This adds a further layer to the 
“transnational habitus” as geographic movement is hierarchically ranked, with certain 
destinations imagined as more powerful than others. The following narratives 
highlight these “hierarchies of globalization” (Carling 2002: 37) in which individuals 
are differentially incorporated into the global market and benefit unequally, if at all, 
from it (Bal and Roos Willems 2014: 255). They show how this “transnational 
habitus”, which dictates that the only way to get ahead is to migrate (Gardner 2008: 
479), continues to structure and stratify the experiences of those who already have 
migrated. As I will explore, those who remained in Italy and did not become flexible 
citizens felt like failures. Drawing on Chiara’s alternative view on “getting ahead” – 
described below – which is premised on the potential of group struggle to improve 
migrants’ conditions, I argue that the grounding of the “transnational habitus” within 
the logics of the global labor market restricts people’s imaginaries of how to achieve 
life betterment.  
Contributing to the sense of failure and despondency for those who remained 
in Italy was a commonly held view among different communities that those who stay 
are either “deficienti” (half-wits) and thus incapable of leaving the country, or 
“delinquenti” (delinquents) profiting from the country’s supposed flexible and 
clientelistic systems. Regardless of whether or not this stereotype is true, the negative 
portrayal of those who remained in Italy was contrasted with the positive depiction of 
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those who had left. During evenings out with volunteers and staff members from the 
centre, the conversation frequently turned to those who were no longer around. I 
learnt the names and characters of a set of volunteers who, with Chiara, had been part 
of the advice centre’s original team. These people were described as political, bright, 
ambitious, and keen to fight for migrants’ rights. Chiara would sigh nostalgically as 
she recalled various events and struggles that they had experienced together. “But 
now he is in your parts,” she would say, referring to different individuals who had 
since migrated to the UK. If not living in the UK, they were in France, Belgium, or 
Germany. “Why did they leave?” I enquired of her. “To find better opportunities 
elsewhere… and because they were smart,” she answered. In this sense, the centre 
acted as a microcosm for a wider pattern in Italy, in which the supposedly best and 
brightest moved on.  
People from all different communities emphatically told me that those 
migrants who had settled in Italy – be they Moroccans, Tunisians, Eritreans, or from 
some other place – were not representative of that national group. Although he did 
occasionally go to Eritrean bars, Biniam always complained about those who 
frequented them: “only those with teste dure [hard heads – fools] are here [in Italy]. 
There is nobody to have a serious conversation with.” On other occasions, when he 
did meet someone he liked, he would enthusiastically and positively discuss how this 
individual was different to the others and how he had been able to have an intelligent 
conversation about the political situation in Eritrea. Similarly, Medhi, a Moroccan 
volunteer at the centre, frequently warned me not to speak to certain of his 
countrymen: “they are delinquents, Anna, stay away from them.” Like Biniam, he 
told me how in Morocco many people were intellectual and political but that here [in 
Italy] the majority were delinquent. Such a discourse about the “low calibre” of 
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migrants who remain in Italy further compounded individuals’ own sense of failure. 
As such, my informants’ denigration of Italy, adulation of perceived superior 
countries, and damning opinions of the type of migrant that remained in Italy made 
their own trajectory appear more negative than it ought to have been. While they 
ultimately attributed their situations to their own failure, their own circumstances in 
fact challenged such sweeping statements about Italy, and the kind of migrant that 
remained there.  
If staying in Italy was perceived as indicative of failure on the part of my 
respondents, it did not mean that people did not get on with their lives or enjoy them. 
Furthermore, despite the frequent lamentations regarding the country, some people 
told me that they preferred life in Italy to that in countries such as Sweden or Norway. 
As I was told by Ahmed, an Algerian man, “life in Italy is better than in Norway. It is 
so cold there, and everybody just stays in their houses.” Migrants’ experiences were 
related to their personal circumstances, their country of origin, and the particularities 
of onward migration for those who shared those origins. For Biniam and other 
Eritreans, it was the sheer scale of on-migration from Italy that made for the sense of 
failure among those who remained. In contrast, individual achievement and economic 
success were reasons for migrants to become more sedentary. Among the Chinese 
people I spoke to, for example, there existed a much lower degree of on-migration – 
and of dissatisfaction as well. This could be related to the fact that Chinese people 
were more likely to own businesses, thus giving them better long-term options. Idris, 
Biniam’s 50-year-old best friend who had previously lived in the United States, 
owned a cleaning business and did not wish to on-migrate. He worked long hours but 
had become relatively financially successful and, unlike Biniam and other Eritreans, 
was relatively satisfied with his life in Italy. Economic success or belief in such a 
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possibility was, therefore, a motivating factor to remain in Italy, even if it was not a 
reality for most. 
Chiara, on the other hand, held a different and uncommon view of migrants 
who left Italy and what their departure signified for those who remained. Despite her 
highly critical opinion of Italy, she firmly believed that migrants should not on-
migrate. While her brother advised those who could do so to leave Italy, Chiara 
passionately argued that it was the responsibility of today’s migrants to make Italy a 
better country for the future. Although she whole-heartedly agreed that quality of life 
was better for migrants elsewhere, she did not think that leaving the country was the 
solution. During an argument with her brother over this topic, she stated: “it is our 
responsibility to stay here. Do you think it was easy in England or France when 
immigrants first arrived? They struggled for the way it is now”. Chiara believed that 
time and commitment were needed from the first generation in order for the situation 
to improve for the next. She passionately argued against what she regarded as 
Biniam’s defeatist “jump-ship” attitude, arguing that it was difficult to imagine a 
better future if the most intelligent and hard-working migrants continued to leave the 
country. She compared the situation to a “brain-drain” in which the best, most 
ambitious, and promising people migrate, meaning that the situation in the “home” 
country never improves. Chiara thus held those who had left partly responsible for the 
lack of development for migrants’ rights in Italy. In her opinion, it was precisely those 
individuals who were needed in order to create change. Demonstrating her strong 
sense of social responsibility and justice, she argued that it was up to individuals like 
her to make the system better. “Us immigrants also have to take responsibility for the 
situation in this country. We can’t only blame the politicians. If we want things to get 
better we have to work for it, like people have done before in other countries.” 
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Discussing the drastic rise in the cost of permit renewal, Chiara exclaimed: “We 
[immigrants] have to get pissed off! We cannot accept this situation, we need to react. 
People like me can be the portavoce [spokesperson], but we need the masses behind 
us.” For Chiara, collective action and solidarity were needed to improve the situation. 
Yet such views were not commonly held. Instead, possibilities for betterment were 
seen to lie elsewhere. This widespread understanding of Italy as a stepping stone 
country added a particular dimension to migrants’ sense of disappointment and 
infused the experience of those that remained.  
Chiara’s view about on-migration also highlights the limitations of 
Appadurai’s theory of social imagination. While his acknowledgement of the power 
and widespread nature of social imagination is pertinent, as Ong notes, “he gives the 
misleading impression that everyone can take equal advantage of mobility and 
modern communications” (1999: 11). Indeed, those such as Biniam, who were not 
able to on-migrate due to financial difficulties, show that access to the benefits of 
capitalism are far from equally distributed. When flexibility was not obtained, rather 
than identifying “the processes that increasingly differentiate[d] the power of mobile 
and nonmobile subjects” (Ong 1999: 11), those who remained in Italy attributed their 
immobility to personal failure. Indeed, Biniam’s opinion that those who remained 
were “deficienti” was accompanied by an acute sense of his own failure to improve 
his life conditions by on-migrating. Moreover, as Chiara strongly asserted, the social 
imaginary based on mass-media and transnational connections, which posits 
migration as the only means to achieve success, is ultimately guided by the “cultural 
logics of accumulation” (Ong 1999: 6) that, by their very nature, neglect other kinds 
of future imaginaries. As Chiara argued, this neglect of collectivist imaginaries for 
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those remaining in Italy impeded the chance to build greater equality for migrants and 
their children in the future.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Like the social imaginary that drives initial migration flows, my informants’ desire to 
on-migrate from Italy highlights the uneven and hierarchical nature of globalization, 
since not all destination countries are considered equal. The low-status and low-paid 
work to which migrants are restricted, and the racialized discrimination they suffer, 
accentuates their unequal incorporation into the global labor market from which they 
scarcely benefit. Like their initial migration, mobility and on-migration from Italy was 
seen as the only way to improve their life conditions. Italy’s relatively malleable 
immigration laws, as well as the EU’s freedom of movement agreements, allow 
migrants a certain amount of mobility, which encourage and concretize such 
imaginations of life elsewhere. Situating my informants’ desires to on-migrate within 
the cultural logics of accumulation (Ong 1999: 6), I have shown that non-elite 
migrants can also be considered as flexible citizens. Yet the flows and flexibilities 
celebrated by capitalism are also intimately connected to the global inequalities it 
creates. For those who do manage to move on, their position as the most marginalized 
in society continues in a new setting, while those who remain wrestle with the 
enduring belief that they have failed. Imaginaries of better futures, meanwhile, are 
restricted to individual and family oriented projects rather than collective struggles to 
create a fairer and more equal society.  
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1 Earlier generations of Eritrean refugees were more likely to stay in Italy due to 
perceived ties created through the shared colonial history (see Arnone 2008: 325). 
 
2. In Italy those who have been granted asylum do not automatically receive housing 
or any kind of financial support. 
 
3. The Dublin Regulation (previously the Dublin Convention) was originally set up in 
1990. The principle of the Regulation is to ensure that asylum seekers apply for 
asylum in the first EU member state to which they arrive.  
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